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INTRODUCTION
We frame the matter addressed in this Article with the following
hypothetical:
Wanda, while pregnant, suffers an injury immediately after toxic
fumes are negligently released while she is at work. Her fetus also 
suffers injury as a result of the release but is born alive. Jim, 
Wanda’s spouse, was visiting at Wanda’s workplace when the
release occurred and observed Wanda breathing the toxic fumes
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778 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
and her subsequent injury, as well as suffering inhalation injury 
himself.
Evidently, Jim can recover from the employer in tort for his physical
injury, while his spouse, Wanda, cannot, because workers’ compensation 
law displaces tort law for accidental injury occurring due to employment. 
Whether Jim and Wanda’s subsequently born daughter can recover for her
injuries suffered in utero may depend on whether those injuries were 
suffered directly from exposure to the fumes or were a consequence of the
injury to her mother.1 
But there are losses other than the physical ones. Wanda’s physical 
injury left her in an emotional funk and uninterested in others, including
her husband and daughter. Both of them have suffered harm to the
relationship they would have had with Wanda as wife and mother—an
interest commonly termed consortium. This interest encompasses
affection, comfort, advice, and other attendant benefits of the relationship. 
Wanda, similarly, may suffer a comparable loss in her relationship with
her husband and daughter consequential to their physical injuries.2 
1. See infra text accompanying notes 67–88. Arguably, the child’s claim
arose out of the injury to Wanda if the child’s claim was consequential to Wanda’s 
injury. See Peters ex rel. Peters v. Texas Instruments Inc., No. CIV.A. 10C-06-
043JRJ, 2011 WL 4686518, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2011) (Texas law) 
(relying on consequential nature of fetus’s injury to conclude claim was barred by
workers’ compensation exclusive remedy provision while distinguishing cases in 
which fetal injury was not consequential to parent’s injury); see also Sena v.
Mount Sinai Hosp., 1994 WL 411142, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 14, 1994)
(permitting child injured in utero to proceed with a negligence claim against the
mother’s employer without addressing whether child’s injury was direct or 
consequential); accord Omori v. Jowa Hawaii Co., 981 P.2d 703, 703 (Haw. 
1999); Ledeaux by Ledeaux v. Motorola Inc., 101 N.E.3d 116, 131–32, app.
denied sub nom. Ledeaux v. Motorola, Inc., 108 N.E.3d 826 (Ill. 2018).
2. To the careful reader, Jim may have suffered a different type of emotional 
harm from the distress due to his damaged relationship as a result of observing
the injury suffered by Wanda. Such a bystander negligent infliction of emotional
distress (NIED) claim might be barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act, as it 
“arises from the injury” to his spouse. See infra text accompanying notes 67–72;
Snyder v. Michael’s Stores, Inc., 945 P.2d 781, 785 (Cal. 1997). But see Collins
v. COP Wyoming, LLC, 366 P.3d 521, 527 (Wyo. 2016) (permitting a parent’s 
bystander NIED claim based on observing his son’s death at work on the grounds 
that the parent’s injury “is outside of the ‘grand bargain’ because worker’s
compensation provides no remedy for it”); Sacco v. High Country Indep. Press,
896 P.2d 411, 417–18 (Mont. 1995). Wanda’s consortium claims, in contrast to
those asserted by her daughter and husband for their loss of relationship with her,
might not be barred because they are not injuries suffered within the scope of
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  123 8/17/20  7:18 AM










    
  
 
     
 
 




   
    
  
7792020] CONSORTIUM AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
The matter we address in this Article is the availability of Jim’s
consortium claim based on the injury to Wanda—spousal consortium— 
that occurs at work, although the same principles are applicable to the 
parent’s child (or to the child’s parental) consortium where such are
recognized.3 The physical harm to Wanda is the bailiwick of workers’
compensation, a no-fault compensation system adopted early in the 20th 
century. Spousal consortium claims, on the other hand, are a matter of tort 
law. Remarkably, almost universally, courts hold that the deprived 
spouse’s4 consortium claim is barred when the injury to the spouse arose
employment, as the harm will predominantly be suffered at home or in other non-
employment venues. See Omori, 981 P.2d at 703 (permitting consortium claims 
based on in utero injury that occurred in a work-related accident); Ledeaux, 101 
N.E.3d at 131–32 (permitting child consortium claim on similar facts to the
hypothetical); Meyer v. Burger King Corp., 26 P.3d 925, 930 (Wash. 2001) 
(semble).
3. We leave for another day the related matter of the effect of exclusive
remedy provisions on wrongful death and survival actions, although as we suggest
in our analysis of the specific language employed in those provisions, a stronger 
case can be made for barring wrongful death and survival actions than for
consortium suits. See infra text accompanying notes 103–106.
4. Throughout, we use the term “deprived spouse” to refer to the spouse who 
claims that she suffered lost consortium, while employing “injured spouse” to 
refer to the spouse who suffered physical or emotional harm. 
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  124 8/17/20  7:18 AM




     
 
 
    
   
   
   
 
 
   
  




      
    
   
 
 
    
    
  
   
 
    
   
 
 






   
  
 







780 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
out of the latter’s employment.5 As far as we know, this Article is the first
comprehensive effort to address this grossly unfair state of affairs.6 
5. Our research failed to identify a single state in which consortium claims
are currently permitted against a spouse’s employer. In two states, Pennsylvania
and Utah, we found no precedent addressing the issue. One of those states, Utah,
bars wrongful death claims against employers. The case adopting that bar in its 
concluding language is broad enough to suggest in dicta that no consortium claim 
exists. See Morrill v. J & M Const. Co., 635 P.2d 88, 89 (Utah 1981) (“[T]he Act 
is the exclusive vehicle for recovery of compensation for injury or death, against
the employer . . . to the exclusion of ‘any and all other civil liability whatsoever,
at common law or otherwise,’ and that it bars all next of kin or dependents, or
anyone else, from using any other means of recovery against employers and others 
named in and covered by the Act, than the Act itself.”). The Larson treatise 
incorrectly identifies Louisiana as a state permitting such consortium claims. See
9 LEX K. LARSON ET AL., LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 101.02 
n.6 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2019). The treatise cites Raney v. Walter O. Moss
Reg’l Hosp., 629 So. 2d 485 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1993), writ denied, 635 So. 2d 
1134 (La. 1994). The case involved family members of an employee who was
infected with Hepatitis B. The family members sued for their medical expenses 
for tests to determine whether they were also infected, for vaccinations, and for
their fear of infection. The court there explicitly remarked: “The plaintiffs are not
pursuing a loss of consortium claim.” Id. at 488. The court went on to distinguish 
consortium claims from the claims the plaintiffs were pursuing. Another case
decided the same year reaffirmed that Louisiana does not permit consortium
claims by deprived spouses of injured employees. See Vallery v. S. Baptist Hosp.,
630 So. 2d 861, 865 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1993), writ denied, 634 So. 2d 860 (La.
1994). The Larson treatise also incorrectly identifies Oklahoma as a state
permitting consortium claims, citing a 1928 case that addressed a parent’s right to
recover for loss of a child–employee’s “services” due to an employment injury.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in a 1983 decision made plain that a spouse’s
consortium claim was barred by the exclusivity provision in the state’s workers’
compensation act. See Rios v. Nicor Drilling Co., 665 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Okla.
1983). Finally, Larson cites a 1962 federal district court case in Oregon that
permitted a wife’s consortium action to proceed but, following a “But cf.” signal,
refers to an Oregon Supreme Court case holding directly contrary to the federal 
case. See LARSON ET AL., supra, § 1001.02D n.1 (referencing Ellis v. Fallert, 307 
P.2d 283 (Or. 1957)).
6. Two casenotes in 1950 and 1951 discussed the seminal Hitaffer case, see
infra text accompanying notes 35–49, which held that consortium claims are not 
barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the District of Columbia Workers’
Compensation Act. Both criticized its holding: 
The consequences of the Hitaffer case, if it remains unimpeached, will
undoubtedly be extensive. The effect of this decision on the employer is
manifest. The employer will be required to satisfy judgments of varying 
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  125 8/17/20  7:18 AM






   
  












      











   
  
  
   
 
  
   
   
        
7812020] CONSORTIUM AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
We proceed first with a brief and stylized explanation of the adoption 
of workers’ compensation statutes and their scope. We then address the
emergence of modern consortium claims from their historical basis that
relied on the notion that harm to a wife constituted property damage for 
which a husband could recover. Wives, of course, had no such claims
because, until the Married Women’s Acts of the late 19th century, they 
had no right to sue on their own behalf. The initiation and development of
these two different aspects of compensation for accidental injury are 
important for an understanding of how best to accommodate a 
compensation scheme with a tort claim.7 
amounts without having recourse to the certainty of workmen’s
compensation insurance.
Jack G. Clarke, Note, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 148, 154 (1950). We cannot resist
responding with the observation that the employer being required to satisfy tort 
judgments without recourse to the certainty of workers’ compensation insurance
is exactly what the employer has to do with regard to any torts it commits that 
harm non-employees. That is why the employer almost certainly would have
purchased liability insurance. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY
CENTURY (Harvard Univ. Press 2008). The second note was milder in its critique:
Although the consequences may appear harsh, the workmen’s
compensation acts were intended to benefit the employer as well as the 
employee, and the consequences therefore are not necessarily absurd or 
illogical. Other courts construing nearly identical language have held 
that it clearly and unambiguously bars an action for consortium. Since 
the ordinary meaning of the language is not inconsistent with the policy
of workmen’s compensation, it would perhaps be sounder to leave
correction of any injustice to legislative action.
Note, 35 MINN. L. REV. 423, 427 (1951) (footnotes omitted). We think this author 
demonstrates a failure to understand the policy of workers’ compensation, which 
addresses injury to employees, not tortious injury inflicted on third parties by the
employer.
7. Another area in which this “meshing issue” arises is when an employee
is injured at work, and a third party, such as the manufacturer of industrial
machinery, is liable in tort to the employee who is also entitled to workers’ 
compensation from her employer. The question of the employee’s recovery and
the respective liability of employer and third party is a difficult one, complicated 
by the adoption of comparative responsibility and the modification of joint and
several liability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF
LIABILITY § C20 cmts. b–d (1998); Andrew R. Klein, Apportionment of Liability 
in Workplace Injury Cases, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 65 (2005). 
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  126 8/17/20  7:18 AM




     
 
 
    
  
 
   
  
    




   
   
 
     
       
       
   
   
       
      
   
    
  
  
    
   
   
  
   
  
 




    
     
 
782 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND CONSORTIUM
A. Workers’ Compensation
Widespread concern about the impact of industrial workplace 
accidents on injured employees and their families served as the impetus
for workers’ compensation.8 Studies conducted early in the 20th century 
found that over 15,000 workplace injuries in New York occurred in a 
single year. Employment in the railroad industry was particularly
hazardous. One frequently cited statistic from the late 19th century states
that a railroad brakeman had an almost 80% chance of dying prematurely.9 
Victims of these injuries were often left with no recourse because tort law 
at the time was unreceptive to workers’ claims, with employers 
successfully asserting a trilogy of defenses.10 
States began to investigate ways to help alleviate the plight of injured
employees by the early 1900s. The federal government weighed in as well 
at the instigation of President Theodore Roosevelt, who made the issue of
workplace safety a priority.11 After a brief constitutional hiccup,12 the 
8. See ABRAHAM, supra note 6, at 42–43. 
9. See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMM’N, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 85
(1889); see also MARK ALDRICH, DEATH RODE THE RAILS: AMERICAN RAILROAD
ACCIDENTS AND SAFETY 1828–1965, at 103–07 (2006); WALTER LICHT,
WORKING FOR THE RAILROAD: THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 190–97 (1983); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC:
CRIPPLED WORKING MEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF
AMERICAN LAW 3 (2004).
10. These defenses included contributory negligence and assumption of risk,
which were applicable to all tort cases of the era, and the fellow–servant rule,
which was peculiar to the workplace and exempted an employer from vicarious
liability when the plaintiff was an employee. See ORIN KRAMER & RICHARD
BRIFFAULT, WORKERS COMPENSATION: STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL COMPACT
14–15 (1991); Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the
Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 51–53 (1967) (discussing the 
fellow–servant rule); Paul C. Weiler, Workers’ Compensation and Product 
Liability: The Interaction of a Tort and a Non-Tort Regime, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 825,
827 (1989).
11. See WITT, supra note 9, at 2–4. Roosevelt was not the first U.S. President
to do so. Benjamin Harrison had repeatedly urged Congress to enact legislation to
address safety for railroad employees. Johnson v. S. Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1, 19–20 
(1904).
12. The Supreme Court struck down the first version of FELA that was
enacted in 1906. See The Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 492 (1908) 
(holding Interstate Commerce Clause did not authorize Congress to protect 
intrastate railroad workers). This deficiency was corrected two years later by 
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  127 8/17/20  7:18 AM











    
 





   
  
  





   
 
    
 
 
     
  
    
    
  
      
     
      
 
       
   
     
  
     
     
7832020] CONSORTIUM AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) was put into place in 1908. To 
avoid what were thought to be serious constitutional issues, FELA retained
a system based on fault but modified or eliminated several aspects of
common law torts that foiled most injured workers’ claims.13 New York
enacted the first comprehensive workers’ compensation system in 1910,
but the system was found unconstitutional as a violation of the employer’s 
state and federal due process rights because it imposed civil liability
without a showing of negligence.14 In 1913, the New York state legislature
passed a constitutional amendment allowing such a law; workers’ 
compensation was thereafter upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.15 Other
states introduced workers’ compensation systems over the next several
decades,16 which are now in place in all 50 states.17 
The central feature of workers’ compensation is the elimination of
fault from the determination of eligibility to recover for injury suffered in
the scope of employment. Neither employee contributory negligence nor
lack of employer wrongdoing is considered in determining an injured
worker’s eligibility for compensation.18 The elimination of fault produced
a more streamlined and efficient mechanism for compensating injured
workers. With fault eliminated, injured workers would recover
compensation far more frequently than they had with common law tort.19 
But the compensation that workers’ compensation provided was less 
revising the Act to limit coverage to employees engaged in interstate railroad 
operations. See Act of Apr. 22, 1908, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at
45 U.S.C. § 51).
13. Act of June 11, 1906, ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232 (1906) (abrogating the 
fellow–servant rule and providing that slight contributory negligence would 
reduce, but not bar, the plaintiff’s recovery).
14. Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911). Price V. Fishback &
Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’ Compensation in the United 
States, 1900–1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305, 319–20 (1998).
15. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). Wisconsin adopted
the first effective workers’ compensation system but employed elective, rather
than mandatory, participation. See KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 10, at 16.
16. By 1917, 37 states had adopted workers’ compensation. See KRAMER &
BRIFFAULT, supra note 10, at 16; Fishback & Kantor, supra, note 14, at 307 
(“most states enacted the law within a very short period in the 1910s”).
17. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS § 36.2, at 912 (2d ed. 2017).
18. See Michael D. Green & Daniel S. Murdock, Employers’ Liability and 
Workers’ Compensation in the United States, in EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY (Ken 
Oliphant ed., 2012).
19. One study found that 37% of families recovered nothing when a worker
was killed on the job. KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra, note 10, at 15.
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  128 8/17/20  7:18 AM




   
  




   















   
  
 
       
    
      
  
    
    
         
 
      
  
  
        
  
784 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
generous than the damages available in a successful tort suit.20 Making
workers’ compensation the exclusive remedy for injured workers was
critical to these compensation systems.21 Thus, the employee cannot sue
her employer in tort, nor can she sue co-employees for whom the employer 
would be vicariously liable.22 
Overall, one can conceptualize workers’ compensation as a global
scheme that entails an employee’s trading off a tort action against the 
employer—the exclusive remedy provision—in exchange for
compensation on a no-fault basis in the event of workplace injury. As
two prominent scholars of workers’ compensation put it:
In essence, [workers’ compensation] legislation established an
ex ante “contract” between workers and employers, who
promised to pay a specified set of benefits for all accidents
arising out of or in the course of employment. . . . In return for
relatively more certain and more generous average post-accident 
benefits under workers’ compensation, however, workers 
forfeited their rights to common-law negligence suits.23 
B. Consortium
The roots of modern consortium claims date back to at least the 13th 
century when a writ existed for employers who lost their employee’s 
services because of violence committed by a third party.24 Within a few
centuries, the common law developed a claim by a father for loss of a 
child’s services, although this claim typically involved fraud or enticing 
the child to leave the family home rather than physical injury.25 Around
the same time, judges began recognizing a husband’s claim for loss of his 
wife’s services in the event of her being tortiously injured.26 Notably, the
basis of the claim was that the husband was entitled to the benefits of his
20. 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 1.01 
(Matthew Bender 2010); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 17, at 912–13. 
21. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 17, at 913.
22. The employee may, however, sue “third parties”—others whose tort also 
caused the employee’s workplace injury. See Klein, supra note 7, at 66.
23. Fishback & Kantor, supra note 14, at 305–06.
24. John H. Wigmore, Interference with Social Relations, 21 AM. L. REV.
764, 765 (1887).
25. Id. at 768. We focus here on negligent injury to the injured spouse, as that
is the modern incarnation of marital consortium, although it also covers others
bases of liability for causing physical—or emotional—injury to one spouse.
26. Id. at 769; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §
125, at 931 (5th ed. 1984).
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7852020] CONSORTIUM AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
wife’s services.27 The claim was analogous to a master’s suit for harm
suffered due to injury of a servant.28 By contrast, a wife could not make a 
reciprocal claim when her husband was injured, apparently for two 
reasons: (1) married women at the time could not sue on their own behalf,
and any claim had to be prosecuted with the joinder of the husband, who 
was entitled to the proceeds; and (2) women had no corresponding right to 
the services of their husbands.29 The second reason is more compelling.
Even the husband’s joinder would not be an absolute barrier to such a
claim and indeed mirrors current practice that requires joinder of an
injured and deprived spouse’s claims in a single suit.30 
A major development that affected the right of consortium, albeit not
for decades, occurred in the latter half of the 19th century with a reform
designed to attend to the disadvantageous position of married women. The
Married Women’s Acts provided a variety of rights to those women; the 
important right in these Acts for the development of consortium is that
they entitle women to sue in their own rights and retain as their own
property any monetary recovery obtained.31 Nevertheless, as Professor
Evans Holbrook reported in 1923: “The enlarged right of the wife under 
the Married Women’s Acts is therefore pretty clear; she can generally sue
for any intentional injury to the consortium, but cannot sue for a loss of
consortium due to negligence.”32 
27. Consortium is a marital property right “and includes the exclusive right
to services of the spouse and these contemplate not so much wages or reward
earned as assistance and helpfulness in the relations of conjugal life according to 
their station and the exclusive right to the society, companionship, and conjugal
affection of each other.” Jacob Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 651, 652–53 (1930) (quoting 8 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 429, 
430 (3d ed. 1923)).
28. Id. at 662 (“The action was one in trespass for consortium amisit and the
recovery was as a master’s for the loss of his servant’s services.”); DOBBS ET AL.,
supra note 17, at 718.
29. See id. (“Since the wife had no right to the services of her husband at
common law, she had no cause of action for an interference with the marriage
relationship.”); Evans Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22
MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1923).
30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: CONCLUDING PROVISIONS § 48A
cmt. j (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2020).
31. Holbrook, supra note 29, at 4.
32. Id. at 6. After the Married Women’s Acts, some courts confronting the
asymmetrical treatment of husbands and wives when spousal injury caused harm
to the marital relationship corrected the discrimination by holding husbands could
no longer assert consortium claims. Lippman, supra note 27, at 665–66; KEETON
ET AL., supra note 26, at 932.
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786 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Thus, when the first Restatement of Torts was published in 1938, it
recognized only a husband’s right to consortium.33 That Restatement did,
however, reflect a development in the content of consortium, moving 
toward recognition of the relational aspect of marriage, including
“society” and “sexual relations,” while still retaining the historical
protection for a wife’s “services.”34 
The break in the deeply gendered history of consortium occurred in
1950 with Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,35 a case in which a deprived wife sued 
the employer of her impaired husband who was injured due to the
employer’s negligence. Hitaffer took the same tack as the Torts 
Restatement, recognizing that “love, affection, companionship, sexual
relations, etc.” were all included in the interests protected by consortium.36 
Dismissing the flimsy reasons courts had proffered for denying spousal 
consortium claims to wives, the court took a strong stand on recognizing 
a wife’s spousal consortium claim:
It is therefore the opinion of this court that in light of the existing 
law of this jurisdiction, in light of the specious and fallacious 
reasoning of those cases from other jurisdictions which have 
decided the question, and in light of the demonstratable
desirability of the rule under the circumstances, a wife has a cause
of action for loss of consortium due to a negligent injury to her
husband.37 
33. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 693 (1938). Section 693 is titled “Action by
Husband for Harm Caused by Tort Against Wife.” Although the first Restatement
recognized the Married Women’s Acts but ignored the implications for permitting 
women a complementary claim, id. cmt. c, at least one court had recognized a
wife’s right to recover for lost consortium for negligent injury to her husband. See 
Hipp v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 108 S.E. 318, 323 (N.C. 1921). Four
years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court overruled Hipp in Hinnant v. Tide 
Water Power Co., 126 S.E. 307 (N.C. 1925).
34. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 693. Four years before publication of the
Restatement, Leon Green made a plea for precision in recognizing legally
cognizable interests and specifically sought to distinguish property rights—the
husband’s property right to his wife’s services—from relational interests, such as
marriage, that provide to spouses affection, love, comradeship, and sexual 
relations. Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460 (1934).
35. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
36. Id. at 813.
37. Id. at 819. The Harper, James, and Gray treatise lauds the Hitaffer court’s
holding affording a consortium claim to married women: “This devastating attack
on the older rule achieved wide acceptance as a realistic approach to the problem. 
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  131 8/17/20  7:18 AM








   
 
    
   
  
     
 
 
    
 
 
    
  
    
   
 
 
    
     
      
      
 
 
          
    
     
   
    
   
 
   
7872020] CONSORTIUM AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
Within a generation, virtually every state extended a consortium claim
to wives whose husbands’ injuries damaged the marital relationship.38 
This change was reflected in the Second Restatement of Torts, which
afforded a consortium claim to both spouses,39 unlike its predecessor.
III. MESHING WORKERS’ COMPENSATION WITH CONSORTIUM
Hitaffer was also the first case that confronted the intersection between 
a loss of consortium claim and a workplace injury.40 After resolving the
matter of women’s consortium claims, the court proceeded to the second 
issue presented: the effect of the exclusive remedy bar in the D.C. 
Workers’ Compensation statute on Ms. Hitaffer’s consortium claim
stemming from her husband’s injury sustained at work.
The exclusive remedy provision of the D.C. Workers’ Compensation 
statute read:
The liability of an employer prescribed in . . . this title shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the 
employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents,
dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover 
damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of 
such injury or death . . . .41 
Beginning its analysis, the court observed: “We would be less than
candid if we did not admit that the plain and literal language of this section
of the Act has such broad implications that it could be conceived to vitiate 
any right of action flowing from the compensable injury.”42 The court
reasoned, “such a broad interpretation was not and could not have been 
Seldom has any single opinion been so influential.” 2 FOWLER HARPER ET AL.,
HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 8.9, at 661 (3d ed. 2006).
38. See HARPER ET AL., supra note 37, 692; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: CONCLUDING PROVISIONS § 48 A, Reporter’s Note to cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST., Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2020) (reporting that, in all but one state, Virginia, 
both spouses are afforded a consortium claim).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 69 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
40. See Hitaffer, 183 F.2d 811. 
41. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1927). The District of Columbia Workmen’s
Compensation Act adopted the federal workers’ compensation act for
longshoremen. See Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
(“[T]he District of Columbia Workmen’s Compensation Act . . . adopts as the 
compensation law for the District of Columbia the Longshoremen’s and Harbor 
Workers’ Act.”).
42. Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 819. 
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  132 8/17/20  7:18 AM






















   
 
 
   
 
 




    
   
    
 
  
    
   
788 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
intended when the result would be such as to lead to the absurd and
illogical consequence indicated in this case.”43 The court’s concern for
candor led to a less than probing consideration of the statutory language 
as we attempt to demonstrate below.44 
Proceeding to explain why such a broad interpretation was imprudent, 
the court noted:
There can be no doubt but that this section is designed to make the 
employer’s liability under this statute exclusive of any other 
liability either at law or in admiralty to the injured employee or
anyone suing in the employee’s right. But where a third person is 
suing in his or her own right on account of the breach [sic] some
independent duty owed them by the employer, even though the
operative facts out of which this independent right and correlative 
duty arose are the same as those out of which the injured employee 
recovers under the Act, the Act does not proscribe the third 
person’s cause of action.”45 
The nature of who sustains the injury—here, only the non-employee 
wife—led the court to the conclusion that lost consortium is outside the 
scope of the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act:
“There can be no doubt, therefore, the injury to the consortium is an injury
to a right which is independent of any right in the other spouse and to
which the defendant owes an independent duty.”46 Thus, given the
deprived wife’s suit for the employer’s negligence in breaching a duty to
her that caused her harm, “we cannot say that the Act was designed to 
deprive her of her action.”47 
The court based its second rationale on the fact that workers’ 
compensation systems provide compensation only to the injured worker:
Moreover, it would be contrary to reason to hold that this Act cuts 
off independent rights of third persons when the whole structure
demonstrates that it is designed to compensate injured employees 
or persons suing in the employee's right on account of
employment connected disability or death. It can hardly be said 
43. Id.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 73–80.
45. Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 819–20 (noting “in a case where the employer had 
secured payment under the Act to the injured employee and the employee
thereafter brought an action against the third party, joint tortfeasor, that party was 
allowed to implead the employer in order to get contribution.”).
46. Id. at 820.
47. Id.
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7892020] CONSORTIUM AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
that it was intended to deprive third persons of independent causes 
of action where the Act does not even purport to compensate them 
for any loss. A brief examination of it will reveal that there is no 
provision therein for compensating a spouse for the loss of
consortium. As we have already pointed out, no distinction is 
made as between the amount of compensation payable to married
and unmarried injured male claimants, despite the fact that the
latter [sic] was under a legal duty to support the wife, and any
impairment of the ability to perform that duty is a compensable
element of damages, belonging to the wife where the husband has
failed to recover therefor.48 
Hitaffer therefore concluded it was erroneous to dismiss the wife’s
complaint for loss of consortium, permitting her case to proceed,
notwithstanding the exclusivity provision of the D.C. Workers’ 
Compensation Act.49 
Seven years after Hitaffer, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia revisited the issue. In Smither & Co. v. Coles,50 the court 
overruled Hitaffer.51 Rather than relying on the text of the statute itself, the
Smither court dove into the justifications behind the enactment of workers’ 
compensation statutes as a whole:
The history of the development of statutes, such as this, creating a
compensable right independent of the employer’s negligence and 
notwithstanding an employee’s contributory negligence, recalls
that the keystone was the exclusiveness of the remedy. This 
concept emerged from a balancing of the sacrifices and gains of 
both employees and employers, in which the former relinquished 
whatever rights they had at common law in exchange for a sure 
recovery under the compensation statutes, while the employers on
their part, in accepting a definite and exclusive liability, assumed
an added cost of operation which in time could be actuarially
measured and accurately predicted; incident to this both parties




50. Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
51. Id. at 222. 
52. Id.
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790 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Smither relied on the exclusive remedy aspect of the Workers’ 
Compensation statute’s scheme to take a shot at the ruling in Hitaffer: 
“Thus, anything that tends to erode the exclusiveness of either the liability 
or the recovery strikes at the very foundation of statutory schemes of this
kind, now universally accepted and acknowledged.”53 Responding to the
plaintiff’s argument that there could be no legislative intent to bar a wife’s
consortium claim because no such claim existed when the D.C. Workers’
Compensation statute was enacted in 1927, the court, after acknowledging 
the plausibility of the claim, simply stated, “the objectives of the
legislation and the statutory scheme, considered as a whole, strongly if not 
conclusively support the result we now reach.”54 
The plaintiff’s best argument emphasized the Hitaffer reasoning that 
it would be “contrary to reason” for the Workers’ Compensation statute to
cut off independent rights of third-party non-workers.55 Recall that the
limited liability on which the Smither court relied did not extend to third
parties tortiously injured by the employer or its agents. Thus, in the 
hypothetical with which we began, both Jim and his daughter were free to
pursue their physical injury claims, notwithstanding the exclusive remedy
bar.
Smither responded with the antiquated idea that denied a wife the right
to sue because all of her rights were “merged” with her husband’s, 
declaring:
Absent a compensable injury to the [employed] spouse there 
would be no claim to assert against the employer . . . under this
statute, as indeed under the statutory scheme of such statutes
everywhere, all the rights of “husband or wife” are merged into
the exclusive remedy provided by the Act and are barred by a
recovery under the Act.56 
Finally, the court relied on two post-Hitaffer U.S. Supreme Court cases
holding that a third party could not pursue a contribution claim against an 
53. Id.
54. Id. at 223 (conceding “[t]he most that can be said for this argument is that
Congress did not take into account that one day, whether by judicial or legislative
action, a wife might be granted the right to sue for loss of consortium on account
of an injury to the husband.”). 
55. See id. at 224; see also Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 820 (D.C.
Cir. 1950). 
56. Smither & Co., 242 F.2d at 225. Smither also noted that a couple of 
federal courts had ruled contrary to Hitaffer after it had been decided. Id.
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7912020] CONSORTIUM AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
employer for an occupational injury for which the third party was also
liable.57 
Today, no state permits a spouse58 to pursue a consortium claim 
against the injured spouse’s employer.59 Although two courts did sanction 
such suits, the legislature in each state subsequently overturned that
authority.60 The reasoning and rationale of the courts is a bit diverse but
can be summarized in four main groups. First, some courts relied on the 
exclusive remedy provision in the workers’ compensation statute,
concluding that its language bars such claims.61 Second, other courts 
57. Id. at 224 n.16. That reasoning, as we explain infra text accompanying 
note 104, ignores a critical distinction between consortium and contribution
claims: Consortium claims are for harm to the deprived spouse; contribution 
claims seek to recover damages already paid for harm to the impaired employee.
58. Or a child or parent of an injured employee. Over the past 40 years, a 
significant minority of courts have recognized parental and child consortium
claims that protect the relational interests between family members. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 38, at §§ 48B & 48C. We believe 
that these consortium claims, where recognized, should also be permitted to 
proceed against employers.
59. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 38, at § 48A, Reporters
Note to cmt. k (“Virtually all states that have ruled on this issue have decided that 
a spousal consortium claim cannot be made against an employer when the
impaired spouse is covered by workers’ compensation.”). Indeed, we would take 
an even stronger position than the Restatement: We have been unable to find a 
single state that permits a spousal, parental, or child consortium claim against the
employer of a family member injured at work and covered by workers’ 
compensation.
60. The two states are Massachusetts and New Hampshire. The development
in those states is recited in Powell v. Cole-Hersee Co., 529 N.E.2d 1359, 1361 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1988), and Young v. Prevue Prod., Inc., 534 A.2d 714, 715–16 
(N.H. 1987).
61. See, e.g., Murdock v. Steel Processing Servs., Inc., 581 So. 2d 846, 847 
(Ala. 1991) (“It is clear that § 25-5-53 [the exclusive remedy provision] provides 
that workmen’s compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy for an employee 
and his or her dependents. This includes his or her spouse. In addition, the section
expressly excludes any rights and remedies of a dependent for ‘loss of services.’
Thus, a claim for loss of consortium is barred by this clause.”). With some
frequency, the court made no effort to carefully consider the language in the
applicable provision and its meaning, simply cursorily concluding that it barred
any consortium claims. Surely, the sloppiest example of this is Vallery v.
S. Baptist Hosp., 630 So. 2d 861 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1993), in which the court,
addressing language barring claims by dependents and relations from suing “for 
said injury,” wrote: 
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792 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
relied, in whole or in part, on the notion that the consortium claim is
“derivative” and therefore the deprived spouse has no greater rights than
the impaired spouse.62 Frequently, courts invoked other courts’ rulings on
the matter,63 and some cited the comprehensive Larson treatise as
The word “injury” in the statute’s phrases “an injury” and “for said 
injury” clearly refers to the injury to the employee. Thus, the 
“defendants” and “relations” of the employee cannot make negligence
claims against the employer for injuries to the employee—such as Mrs.
Vallery’s present claim for loss of consortium.
Id. at 864.
62. See, e.g., Alexander v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 124, 444 P.2d 397, 400 
(Colo. 1968) (relying on the ground that the consortium plaintiff’s rights “are
strictly derivative,” as well as upon the statutory language); Mergenthaler v.
Asbestos Corp. of Am., 534 A.2d 272, 280–81 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987) (“A claim 
for loss of consortium is derivative to that of the injured spouse and is dependent
upon the existence of a valid claim by the injured spouse for physical injury. . . . 
To the extent that availability of workmen’s compensation to the injured spouse
bars the injured spouse from preserving a tort action for physical injuries, the 
spouse is also barred from recovering damages for loss of consortium resulting 
from those injuries.”); Bourassa v. ATO Corp., 317 N.W.2d 669, 671 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1982) (“Plaintiff Karen Bourassa’s claim is for loss of consortium. Because
her husband’s claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act, her
claim is derivative and is also barred.”); Sama v. Cardi Corp., 569 A.2d 432, 433
(R.I. 1990) (holding that because consortium plaintiff’s claim is derivative of her
husband’s tort claim and because that claim is barred by exclusive remedy 
provision, consortium plaintiff’s claim was also barred); Reed Tool Co. v. 
Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736, 738–39 (Tex. 1980) (holding that the spouse’s 
consortium claim “is derivative and that a defense that tends to constrict or
exclude the tortfeasor’s liability to the injured husband will have the same effect
on the wife’s consortium action.”); Derosia v. Book Press, Inc., 531 A.2d 905, 
907 (Vt. 1987). Unsurprisingly, the Bourassa court did not rely on the exclusive 
remedy provision in Michigan’s Workers’ Compensation statute, which provides:
“The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the
employee’s exclusive remedy against the employer for a personal injury or
occupational disease.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.131. Similarly, both the Sama
court and the Copelin court had to rely on their derivative reasoning, as the plain
terms of the Rhode Island and Texas statutes did not bar consortium claims. See 
infra text accompanying note 89.
63. See, e.g., Derosia, 531 A.2d at 907 (referring to “decisions from other
jurisdictions interpreting similar statutory provisions,” along with the derivative 
nature of the consortium claim and statutory language, to bar a consortium claim); 
Provost v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 696 P.2d 1238, 1239–40 (1985). One
state that used this reasoning to support denial of a consortium claim noted the
biggest flaw with this approach: “The persuasive force of the precedent from other
states, however, is diminished by the diverse statutory formulations of immunity 
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7932020] CONSORTIUM AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
support.64 And then, a few courts, including Smither, relied on the analogy 
to contribution and indemnity claims asserted against employers by third-
party tortfeasors who were sued by an employee in tort for the same injury 
covered by workers’ compensation.65 
A fifth way—and certainly the most bizarre method—came from 
Kentucky, where the Supreme Court reasoned that a person’s decision to 
take a job is protected by the federal constitutional right to privacy and 
thus the person’s spouse must consent to waiver of any consortium claim
because otherwise the spouse would have an effective veto over the party’s
ability to accept a job. Yes, that’s actually what the court said—it based 
its conclusion on the hypothesis that without such a consortium waiver, 
employers would not hire married applicants.66 
In light of the role that the statutory exclusive remedy provisions play
in barring consortium claims, consideration of the precise language
employed is, at this point, helpful. Recall that the workers’ compensation 
tradeoff provides compensation to employees for accidental injury 
suffered within the scope of employment. Thus, there are two critical
matters in most states’ workers’ compensation statutes barring tort 
claims.67 The first is those persons who are barred from bringing an action.
and exclusivity among the various states.” McKellar v. Clark Equip. Co., 472 
A.2d 411, 413 (Me. 1984).
64. See Fregeau v. Gillespie, 451 N.E.2d 870, 873 (Ill. 1983) (citing the
Larson treatise for the proposition that “[w]ith near unanimity courts interpreting 
exclusivity provisions with this or comparable language have held that the
provisions preclude actions by a spouse of the employee for loss of consortium”); 
West v. Plastifax, Inc., 505 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Miss. 1987) (citing 2A LARSON,
WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW, §§ 66.10, 66.20 (1983) for the propositions
that exclusive remedy provisions such as Mississippi’s bar consortium claims and
that numerous other states have reached the same outcome); Wesson v. City of 
Milford, 498 A.2d 505, 507 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (relying on and quoting 2A
LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION § 66.00); Hartman v. Cold 
Spring Granite Co., 77 N.W.2d 651, 653, 653 n.5 (1956) (citing the Larson treatise 
for proposition that text writers agree that consortium claims should be barred).
65. See Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
66. Brooks v. Burkeen, 549 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Ky. 1977).
67. The canonical Larson treatise on workers’ compensation attempts a
similar taxonomy of workers’ compensation exclusive remedy provisions but 
employs only one of the dimensions we identify above, relying exclusively on the
persons named whose claims are barred. See 9 LARSON ET AL., supra note 5,
§ 101.01. The first edition of the Larson treatise, published in 1952 and on which 
a number of courts relied in addressing whether consortium claims were barred, 
employed a three-part categorization of exclusive remedy provisions, but we find 
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794 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Obviously, the employee should be barred from bringing an action, but
third parties—such as those who would bring survival actions—should 
also be barred because they are surrogates for the employee’s own tort
claims. Nevertheless, the more expansive the category of those barred, the
broader the potential scope of claims that are excluded. If the only person 
barred from a tort action is the employee herself, then consortium claims,
as well as wrongful death and survival actions, would not be barred. On 
the other hand, a provision barring “all persons” from bringing such a suit
would have a far more expansive scope.68 The intermediate specification 
of “employee”—legal representative and dependents—would best be
understood as barring wrongful death or survival actions but not
consortium claims.69 
The second matter is the specification of what claims are barred.
Workers’ compensation statutes do not bar contract claims by employees
this categorization similarly unhelpful for a careful analysis of the statutory 
language. That version of Larson provided:
There are three general types of “exclusive liability” clause which, for
present purposes, must be carefully identified with the cases that depend
upon them; from the narrowest to the broadest, they are as follows: The 
Massachusetts type, which only says that the employee, by coming
within the Act, waives his common-law rights; the California and
Michigan type, which say that the employer’s liability shall be
“exclusive,” or that he shall have “no other liability whatsoever”; and the
New York type, which carries this kind of statute one step further by 
specifying that the excluded actions include those by such “employee,
his personal representatives, husband, parents, dependents, or next of
kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages, at common law or 
otherwise, on account of such injury or death.”
2 ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON’S WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW § 66.10 
(Matthew Bender 1952).
68. Recall that the applicable provision in the District of Columbia Workers’
Compensation Act barred claims by “employee’s spouse, widow, children, 
parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any 
other person whomsoever.” See supra text accompanying note 41.
69. The Connecticut Workers’ Compensation Act so provides. See Conn.
Gen. Stat. 31-284(a). Yet that is not how the Connecticut Court of Appeals 
interpreted the language. The court, upon determining the plaintiff–consortium 
claimant was a dependent of her spouse, concluded that the exclusive remedy 
provision “unambiguously” barred her claim. Wesson, 498 A.2d at 509 (“As noted 
earlier in this opinion, the immunity section is unambiguous.”). The court
nowhere noted or apparently appreciated the adventitiousness of its ruling, which
would presumably permit consortium claims by non-dependent spouses. The 
Maryland exclusivity provision bars suit by only the employee and dependents of 
the employee. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-509.
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7952020] CONSORTIUM AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
or other enumerated individuals—the workers’ compensation compromise
was about accidental injury to an employee. Thus, the narrowest such 
provision would bar all claims against the employer for injury to the 
employee. Consortium claims are not for injury to the employee, but rather 
for injury suffered by the spouse.70 On the other hand, barring claims for
and on account of injury71 to the employee must bar claims other than 
simply those that concern the employee’s injury, if the additional language 
“on account of” is to be interpreted to have meaning, as standard statutory 
interpretation principles provide. Finally, we note that for the vast majority 
of courts addressing this issue, if doubt arises as to the meaning of the 
exclusive remedy provision, ties go to retaining the common law claim
because statutes in derogation of common law rights must be clearly
expressed.72 
IV. INTERPRETING EXCLUSIVE REMEDY LANGUAGE
Let us proceed by carefully examining the exclusive remedy language 
applicable in Hitaffer and Smither—something neither court did. We think 
the language is reasonably amenable to an interpretation that it does not 
bar consortium claims, but instead bars only claims by other denominated
individuals who seek recovery for the employee’s injury or death. If the
employee dies, both a survival action and a wrongful death action would
be available, absent the bar by the exclusive remedy provision. And, unlike 
consortium claims, wrongful death and survival actions preceded workers’ 
compensation, having been enacted in the latter half of the 19th century.73 
The decedent’s estate is the beneficiary of any recovery in a survival 
action, and the executor, administrator, or legal representative would be
70. Notwithstanding our analysis, the Montana Supreme Court held that an 
employer had no liability for consortium based on an exclusive remedy provision
that provided “an employer is not subject to any liability whatever for the death 
of or personal injury to an employee.” See Maney v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 15 
P.3d 962, 967 (Mont. 2000) (emphasis added). Moreover, in the context of § 39-
71-411 (MONT. CODE ANN.), no liability “for” the injury or death means “[a]s a 
result of; because of” or “[a]s regards; concerning.” The court did this by taking
the word “for” out of context and concluding that it meant “concerning” based on
a dictionary definition, thereby barring all of the claims brought by decedent– 
employee’s legal representative. See id.
71. Or, alternatively, “arising out of injury” to the employee.
72. See Danek v. Hommer, 87 A.2d 5, 8 (1952) (Vanderbilt, C.J., dissenting) 
(“If a change in the common law is to be effectuated, the legislative intent to do 
so must be clearly and plainly expressed.”).
73. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 17, § 28.1, at 685.
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796 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
the appropriate person to pursue a survival action.74 But any recovery in a
survival action would consist of medical expenses, lost wages, and pain 
and suffering occurring before the decedent’s death. Those are precisely
the losses that workers’ compensation covers and that the exclusive
remedy bar was intended to preclude. The inclusion of a variety of family
members and dependents who are barred from recovery from the employer 
might best, in our view, be understood to address wrongful death actions75 
that, depending on the precise parameters of a given state’s act,76 would 
provide recovery to dependents for support lost as a result of the death or
amounts that the deceased’s estate would have accumulated if she had not
died prematurely.77 
Once again, those are all damages provided under tort law, but those
damages are superseded by the payment of workers’ compensation 
benefits. In some states, these wrongful death claims are properly brought 
by the beneficiaries, which could include all family members, other
dependents, and heirs. In others, the personal or legal representative brings 
an action, in effect, on behalf of those beneficiaries.78 Today, some
wrongful death actions permit recovery for non-pecuniary losses.79 Unlike
the pecuniary losses identified above, these losses are not derived from the
deceased’s earnings and are akin to the loss recognized by consortium. In 
74. Id. § 295, at 804.
75. The Montana exclusive remedy provision makes this point explicitly, 
providing that in the case of death, claims by “the employee’s personal
representative and all persons having any right or claim to compensation for the
employee’s injury or death” are barred. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-411 (2019).
76. The exclusive remedy language applicable in the District of Columbia 
was adopted from the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 
which, because it applies to all such injured employees engaged in the specified
vocations, could be applicable to injuries in numerous states whose survival and
wrongful death statutes would provide any right that might otherwise exist due to 
the death of the decedent. Hence, there is a potentially long list of family members 
who might be entitled to recover damages under a given state’s wrongful death
statutes.
77. See Greene v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 573 N.E.2d 452, 453 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1991) (explaining the consortium plaintiff’s interpretation of the exclusive
remedy provision to cover “tort suits brought by an injured employee or, if the
employee dies as a result of the workplace injury, to wrongful death actions
brought by the decedent employee’s personal representative, dependents, or next
of kin.”).
78. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 17, § 298, at 813.
79. These non-pecuniary losses include lost society—the equivalent of 
consortium—and grief or anguish at the loss of one’s spouse. See id. § 297, at
811–13.
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7972020] CONSORTIUM AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
our view, this aspect of wrongful death claims should not be swept within
the exclusive remedy immunity—damages for lost consortium do not
compensate for any harms that the employee could have asserted against
her employer.
We hasten to add that the statutory language in the District of
Columbia’s Workers’ Compensation Act is broader than those states that
employ “for injuries or death” language.80 The applicable statute in 
Hitaffer barred a claim seeking damages from the employer “on account
of such injury or death.” That language is ambiguous and could be 
understood to mean that no claims can be made that depend on injury to
an employee. It might also be understood as barring claims against the 
employer “for such injury or death.” That statutory language, we suggest,
is best interpreted as not barring a claim for a harm different from the harm
the employee suffered, albeit a harm conditioned on injury or death of the 
employee.
Even more clearly, other workers’ compensation statutes do not, by 
their terms, bar consortium claims. For example, the North Carolina 
exclusive remedy provision bars claims by only “the employee, his 
dependents, next of kin,81 or representative,”82 thereby covering claims by
family members who might recover in a survival or wrongful death claim.
That the statute does not bar claims by non-dependent spouses reveals that
the language is best understood as limited to survival or wrongful death
claims whose damages overlap with workers’ compensation benefits. By 
contrast, common law spousal consortium claims do not overlap in any 
way with workers’ compensation benefits. The North Carolina courts held 
otherwise, reasoning that this result would circumvent the purpose of the
provision to limit “employers’ total liability for the injury suffered by the 
80. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23–1022(A) (2019) (“The right to recover
compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an employee or for
the death of an employee is the exclusive remedy against the employer . . . .”); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-411 (“an employer is not subject to any liability
whatever for the death of or personal injury to an employee”); W. VA. CODE § 
23–2–6 (1991) (employer “shall not be liable . . . for the injury or death of any 
employee, however occurring.”) Notwithstanding the language in the Arizona
statute, the court of appeals found it to evince “a clear legislative intent to bar any 
common law right-of-action which might possibly flow from a work-related
injury.” Mardian Const. Co. v. Superior Court In & For Maricopa Cty., 754 P.2d 
1378, 1380–81 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
81. “Next of kin” is defined as the individual’s closest living blood relative
and thus excludes spouses.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (2019).
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798 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
employee.”83 That reasoning ignores that the employer’s liability for injury 
suffered by the employee is limited to the workers’ compensation payment,
while the employer’s liability for injury suffered by the spouse is not so
limited.84 
Pennsylvania’s exclusive remedy provision bars claims against the
employer “on account of any injury or death as defined in the [Workers’
Compensation Act] . . . .”85 Of course, the definition of injury requires that 
it be suffered by an employee, and nowhere mentions loss of consortium.
Texas contains the narrowest exclusive remedy provision, declaring:
“Recovery of workers’ compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of
an employee covered by workers’ compensation insurance coverage or a 
legal beneficiary against the employer or an agent or employee of the 
employer for the death of or a work-related injury sustained by the
employee.”86 The Texas statute includes only the employee and the
employee’s legal representative—the person who would pursue a survival
action in the event of death of the employee—and is limited to claims “for
the death . . . or work-related injury” of the employee.87 Other states have
similarly limited exclusive remedy provisions. 88 
83. Sneed v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 300 S.E.2d 563, 564 (N.C. Ct. App.
1983).
84. In addition to North Carolina, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Vermont bar suits by only those who might pursue a wrongful
death or survival action. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-11 (West 2019); IDAHO CODE
§ 72-203 (2019); IND. CODE § 22-3-2-6 (2019); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-540 (West
2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-108 (West 2019); 21 VT. STAT. ANN. § 622 
(West 2019). Five of these states, unlike North Carolina and South Carolina, 
employ “on account of such injury,” rather than the North Carolina “for such 
injury.” See supra text accompanying note 80.
85. 77 PA. STAT. 411 (2019).
86. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001 (West 2018).
87. Texas is among the states that barred consortium claims based on the
characterization of a consortium claim as derivative—an explanation that
provides not much more than a conclusion. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 26, at
938–39 (“Courts have commonly said that the consortium action is derivative and 
must fall with the main claim, but as they could as well have said that it was
independent, this sounds more like a conclusion than a reason . . . .”); HARPER ET
AL., supra note 37, §8.9, at 657 (noting with regard to whether the negligence of
the impaired spouse should be imputed to the deprived spouse, “[t]o assign, as a
reason, the derivative character of [the deprived spouse’s] action is really begging
the questions since it does little more than to state the result in different language”)
(footnote omitted).
88. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-41 (2019) (explaining workers’ compensation 
benefits “shall be in lieu of all rights and remedies as to such injury now existing,
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7992020] CONSORTIUM AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
V. THE FIX AND WHY WE NEED ONE
We think the universal barring of consortium claims against negligent
employers is untenable, unfair, and not mandated by the exclusive remedy
provision of numerous workers’ compensation statutes.89 Moreover, to the
extent that legislatures explicitly nullify all consortium claims, as occurred
in Massachusetts and New Hampshire, they overreach the compromise 
reflected in workers’ compensation systems.
Our fundamental objection takes us back to the core of the workers’
compensation arrangement: Employees gave up their right to a tort claim 
and its more expansive measure of tort damages in exchange for a
either at common law or otherwise against an employer, or its directors, officers,
agents or employees; and such rights and remedies shall not accrue to employees 
entitled to compensation . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.32.010 (West 2019) 
(“Each worker injured in the course of his or her employment, or his or her family 
or dependents in case of death of the worker, shall receive compensation in 
accordance with this chapter, and, except as in this title otherwise provided, such 
payment shall be in lieu of any and all rights of action whatsoever against any
person whomsoever.”). The Rhode Island statute, which includes common law 
claims within its sweep, might be understood to include common law contribution 
claims, as well as the older loss of services claims by husbands and fathers.
89. Two exceptions are the Massachusetts and New Hampshire exclusive 
remedy provisions. In Ferriter v. Daniel O’Connell’s Sons, 413 N.E.2d 690 
(Mass. 1980), the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that family members were 
permitted to make consortium claims against their family member’s employer. 
The statute in place at the time provided that employees waived the right to sue
their employers in tort unless they notified their employers when hired that they 
declined to waive such right. This was a holdover from the early days of workers’
compensation adoption when legislatures attempted to circumvent constitutional
limitations by making the system elective and providing nudges and carrots to 
have both employers and employees choose workers’ compensation coverage. 
After Ferriter, the Massachusetts Legislature overruled the decision with an
amendment to the Workers’ Compensation Act:
If an employee has not given notice to his employer that he preserves his 
right of action at common law as provided by this section, the
employee’s spouse, children, parents and any other member of the
employee’s family or next of kin who is wholly or partly dependent upon
the earnings of such employee at the time of injury or death, shall also 
be held to have waived any right of action at common law against such 
employer for damage due to loss of consortium, parental guidance,
companionship or the like, when such loss is a result of any injury to the 
employee that is compensable under this chapter.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 152, § 24 (2019).
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800 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
guaranteed but more modest compensation.90 Both employers and 
employees gained and gave up in this global arrangement of the rights of 
employers and employees, which was mandated by law, to be sure, but not 
without support from both labor and industry when these systems were 
adopted.91 Critically, family members were not part of this compromise
and neither received compensation for their harms nor should be required 
to give up their tort claims against the employer of another family
member.92 
What the workers’ compensation system does not compensate are
harms to third parties.93 Jim’s claim, in our opening hypothetical, is not
barred by workers’ compensation because he is a non-employee who
suffered harm, albeit proximately to his spouse’s employment and her 
injury. Jim and Wanda’s daughter, injured in utero at Wanda’s place of
employment, can recover in a tort suit against the employer. Similarly, a
family member injured by asbestos brought home by a family member
who works in a factory manufacturing products containing asbestos is not
90. See supra text accompanying notes 8–23.
91. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 
B19 cmt. l (1998) (explaining that “the plaintiff–employee’s workers’
compensation benefits can be conceptualized as a settlement of tort liability
between the plaintiff–employee and the employer . . . .”); Klein, supra note 7
(analogizing workers’ compensation tradeoff to a mandated settlement of the
employee’s tort claim against the employer).
92. Remarkably, the Indiana Court of Appeals both recognized and 
sympathized with this argument, yet still denied a consortium claim because it felt
bound by the exclusive remedy provision of the state’s workers’ compensation 
statute:
We agree with [consortium plaintiff] that the Act’s policy of
compensating injured workers for lost wages, without distinguishing 
between married and unmarried employees, fails to recognize a separate 
loss incurred by the spouses of married workers. The Act turns away 
from recognizing the distinct nature of harm occasioned by injury to a 
married employee. In so doing, the Act fails to compensate for all harms 
flowing from workplace injuries. The spouse of the injured employee
receives no quid pro quo.
However, we are constrained to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of
Greene’s case. To create a remedy for the inadequacy of the Act is
properly a function of the General Assembly.
Greene v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 573 N.E.2d 452, 453 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
93. This statement puts aside truly derivative claims, such as a survival 
action.
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8012020] CONSORTIUM AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
barred by the exclusivity of workers’ compensation.94 In all of these
instances, employers pay more than workers’ compensation provides to
family members of employees for harms they have suffered. Yet
consortium spouses receive nothing for their loss of consortium. Thus, an 
employer who negligently causes identical injuries to two employees, one 
married and the other single, will pay exactly the same amount in workers’
compensation benefits to each employee. The spouse of the injured
employee who suffers harm in the form of a loss of consortium receives
nothing from the workers’ compensation system. 
To us, this is fundamentally at odds with the grand conception. Thus, 
we find the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
in barring these consortium claims to be so short-sighted that blind-sighted
might be a better characterization:
The history of the development of statutes, such as this creating a
compensable right independent of the employer’s negligence and 
notwithstanding an employee’s contributory negligence, recalls
that the keystone was the exclusiveness of the remedy. This 
concept emerged from a balancing of the sacrifices and gains of 
both employees and employers, in which the former relinquished 
whatever rights they had at common law in exchange for a sure 
recovery under the compensation statutes, while the employers on
their part, in accepting a definite and exclusive liability, assumed
an added cost of operation which in time could be actuarially
measured and accurately predicted; incident to this both parties
realized a saving in the form of reduced hazards and costs of 
litigation.95 
A consortium spouse suffers sacrifice in the relationship with her spouse,
but that is not balanced against any gain provided by the workers’ 
compensation system.
Moreover, the Smither court’s merger reasoning, set out above,96 
reflected antiquated rules and was downright lazy. The idea that any rights
94. See Quisenberry v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., 818 S.E.2d 805, 813 (Va. 
2018) (permitting daughter of employee–father who contracted mesothelioma 
from take-home asbestos exposure to pursue a claim against her father’s employer 
without any mention of workers’ compensation); accord Kesner v. Superior
Court, 384 P.3d 283 (Cal. 2016). But see Quisenberry, 818 S.E. 2d at 817 
(Lemons, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the plaintiff–daughter’s claim should be
barred because permitting suit against the father’s employer “upsets the careful 
balance struck by the legislature in the Workers’ Compensation Act”).
95. Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 222 (D.C. Cir 1957). 
96. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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802 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
of a wife are merged into her husband’s for purposes of a consortium 
lawsuit conflicts with virtually every state’s Married Women’s Act, which 
were enacted in the prior century and provided women the right to sue in 
their own names, freeing them from needing their spouses to pursue
claims.97 Relying on the idea that employees and their non-employee
spouses had their interests “merged” under the Workers’ Compensation 
Act conveniently created grounds to dismiss the claims and sidestep
Hitaffer. Although modern reasons exist for encouraging or even 
mandating joinder—including judicial efficiency and avoiding duplicated
damages—those were far from the Smither court’s mind.
Notably, it is true that consortium claims are conditioned on a tortious 
injury to one’s spouse, but it is not true of the other family tort claims
identified above. The tortious-injury requirement has led some courts to 
describe consortium claims as “derivative” and to further reason that the 
consortium claim cannot proceed if the exclusive remedy provision bars 
the injured employee’s tort claim, as it plainly does. Two difficulties arise
with this reasoning. First, truly derivative claims are asserted by a
surrogate for the actual party who suffered injury. For example, in the
insurance subrogation context, the insurer’s claim is identical to the 
insured’s claim and is brought on the insured’s behalf; it is hence 
“derivative” and subject to any defenses that could have been raised in a
suit by the insured. Or, in shareholder-derivative actions, the plaintiff– 
shareholders bring suit asserting a “derivative” claim belonging to the 
corporation and also subject to any defenses that would bar the company’s 
claim. Consortium claims are different. The deprived spouse is not suing 
on the impaired spouse’s behalf. The deprived spouse has suffered harm 
and asserts her own claim for that distinct and cognizable injury.
Second, characterizing a claim as “derivative,” or alternatively as
“independent” as courts often do with consortium claims, or characterizing
them as both derivative and independent as they also do, or characterizing
them inconsistently in different cases, or even inconsistently in the same
case does not get to the core issue at stake or consider what policies are
applicable.98 There are good reasons to mandate that the impaired spouse
97. Only one other jurisdiction in the country, Maryland, treats consortium 
claims as a right of the marital unit, instead of the right of a husband or wife 
individually. See Deems v. W. Maryland Ry. Co., 231 A.2d 514 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1967). Thus, in Maryland, a claim for loss of consortium “can only be
asserted in a joint action for injury to the marital relationship.” Id. at 525. 
98. An early draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Concluding Provisions 
is critical of the use of characterizations of “derivative” or, contrarily,
“independent” to resolve any of the numerous issues that arise in consortium 
claims:
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8032020] CONSORTIUM AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
and the deprived spouse join their claims wherever feasible, but
characterizing the consortium claim as derivative or independent elides
those good reasons. Whether consortium claims against employers of the 
impaired spouse should be permitted should be based on the applicable 
statute and reasons applicable to this particular issue.
Moreover, we think the statutory provisions exempting employers
from tort suits when an employee is injured are, for the most part,
ambiguous at best, as recited above.99 And that is true of some of the more
expansive exclusive remedy provisions found in workers’ compensation 
statutes.100 By contrast, consider the Kansas Workers’ Compensation Act,
whose narrow exclusive remedy bar specifies: “Save as herein provided, 
no . . . employer . . . shall be liable for any injury for which compensation 
is recoverable under this act . . .”101 The obvious interpretation of this
language is that it covers claims “for any injury for which compensation 
is recoverable”—namely the employee’s injury—because those are the
only injuries compensated by workers’ compensation. That interpretation 
would not include an injury suffered by the spouse who is not entitled to 
compensation under the Act. Nonetheless, without any effort to parse the
statutory language, the Kansas Supreme Court, relying on precedent that 
barred a wrongful death action, ruled, “the exclusive remedy provision of 
the Workmen’s Compensation Act (K.S.A. 44-501) bars an employee or
This terminology is quite confusing, and the various labels rarely provide
a transparent and coherent explanation for resolution of the issue to
which this description is applied because the characterization is a
conclusion rather than an explanation.
Adding to the confusion is that the use of the term “derivative” to 
describe claims typically means something quite different: A derivative
claim is generally a claim in which a secondary plaintiff asserts a claim
on behalf of the primary plaintiff who suffered the loss in question. Thus, 
for example, in the insurance subrogation context, the insurer’s claim is 
identical to the insured’s claim and brought on the insured’s behalf; it is 
hence “derivative.” Or, in shareholder actions, the plaintiff shareholders 
assert a “derivative” claim belonging to the corporation. Consortium
claims are different. The deprived spouse is not suing on the impaired 
spouse’s behalf. The deprived spouse has suffered a distinct harm and 
asserts his or her own claim for that distinct and cognizable injury.
For the reasons above, labeling consortium claims as “independent” or
“derivative” is unhelpful in explicating what is at stake.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: CONCLUDING PROVISIONS § 48A cmt. i
(Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2020).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 67–88.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 68–72.
101. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (West 2019).
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804 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
his dependents from bringing a common-law action against the employer 
to recover damages resulting from injuries sustained by the employee
[including consortium claims].”102 We are hard-pressed to understand how
language providing employer immunity covering “any injury for which
compensation is recoverable” could extend to a spousal consortium claim
for which compensation is not recoverable under the Workers’
Compensation Act.
As acknowledged above, wrongful death and survival actions against 
an employer should be barred. The recovery in those actions reflects sums 
that the employee would have recovered in a tort suit against her employer
that, because of the employee’s death, are being recovered in a different 
proceeding. The employer has provided compensation for the pecuniary 
harm suffered by those family members in its payment of workers’ 
compensation benefits, which include lost wages. Moreover, the right of a
father and husband to recover for “lost services” when a spouse or child
was injured at work reflected the father and husband’s property right to
any earnings by the family member.103 As with wrongful death and 
survival actions, those lost services reflected loss of earnings of the
employee that were compensated by the workers’ compensation deal. Not 
until consortium’s evolution to recognizing harm to relationships did 
consortium relate the independent loss of a family member to the lost 
society, comfort, affection, and, in the cases of spouses, sexual relations
resulting from physical harm to a family member. That evolution occurred
slowly, often through courts taking an expansive view of what constituted
lost services, but had not solidly emerged at the time in the early 20th
century when workers’ compensation was being adopted throughout the 
United States.
To us, common law contribution claims are similar to wrongful death 
and survival actions in how they should be treated by exclusive remedy
provisions and do not provide an analogy for consortium. The Smither 
court, which overruled Hitaffer, noted that “the employer is not liable for
contribution to a third party.”104 But contribution claims by third-party 
tortfeasors who were held liable in tort to an employee injured at work are 
seeking to recover for the damages that were traded off in the workers’ 
compensation compromise and, if recognized, would constitute an end run
around the exclusivity bar. Employers should not be liable, in whole or in
part, for the difference between workers’ compensation and tort damages.
That was part of the workers’ compensation deal.
102. Fritzson v. City of Manhattan, 528 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Kan. 1974).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 23–24.
104. Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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8052020] CONSORTIUM AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
One objection, previously noted, to the use of exclusive remedy 
provisions to bar consortium claims is that, in many cases, the right to 
recover for consortium was not established until after the workers’
compensation statute was enacted. The objection seems persuasive: How,
absent language explicitly adverting to unknown future claims that might
develop, could the legislature be understood to bar a claim that didn’t exist
at the time and that thus was not known by the legislators enacting such 
provisions? A few exclusive remedy provisions might be understood to do 
so, but the vast majority do not support such a legislative intent. Yet courts 
confronted with this argument have sidestepped it and nevertheless
concluded that such legislation does bar consortium claims.105 
The Smither court’s emphasis on the policy of limiting the employer’s
liability is unpersuasive. Workers’ compensation limits liability of the
employer for the injury to the injured worker, but the employer’s liability
should not be limited if it causes harm to persons other than the employee. 
Thus, if on a “bring your child to work day,” a mother brings her daughter 
to work and both are injured by a negligently installed light fixture that 
falls, the employer’s liability to the employee is limited to workers’
compensation benefits. The employer’s liability, however, is not limited
in the sense that it must pay for the harm to the daughter.106 Similarly, the
employer’s liability should not be limited for harm the daughter suffers 
because the mother’s injury prevents her from providing her usual parental 
care to her daughter.
One can understand barring a consortium claim when it consisted of a
loss of services, as it did historically before the modern development
expanding consortium to cover relational harm. The property right to the 
injured wife’s “services” when she was employed outside the home would
consist of her wages to which the husband was legally entitled. In such
situations, the husband was, in essence, standing in the shoes of his wife
seeking recovery for what we now recognize as her harm—from which the 
105. See, e.g., Wright v. Action Vending Co., 544 P.2d 82, 84 (Alaska 1975)
(“Without deciding the jurisprudential question of whether the Schreiner case 
[which provided a consortium claim] created or merely recognized the existence 
of a right to sue for loss of consortium, we conclude that the legislature intended 
to cover this action under the [exclusive remedy] language of [the workers’
compensation act.”).
106. See Cushing ex rel. Brewer v. Time Saver Stores, Inc., 552 So. 2d 730, 
732 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1989) (holding “the Louisiana Worker’s Compensation
Act was neither intended nor purports to affect the rights of an employee’s child
who is injured on the employee’s job site” when equipment fell on the pregnant
mother’s abdomen).
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806 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
employer should be properly shielded because, as noted above, workers’ 
compensation includes compensation for lost wages.107 
CONCLUSION
We think that courts across the land have erred108 in holding that
consortium claims cannot be made against employers whose tortious 
injury to an employee causes harm suffered by the employee’s spouse. 
Those courts failed to appreciate the workers’ compensation “grand 
bargain.” That bargain addressed a deal between employers and
employees on how to handle occupational injury suffered by the latter. 
Spouses were not part of that deal. Just as Jim, in our opening hypothetical,
can recover for his physical injury, he should be permitted to recover for
the form of emotional distress—loss of consortium with Wanda—he also
suffered. Neither of those harms are covered by the workers’
compensation bargain, and neither should be barred by the immunity
provided to employers for injuries to their employees.
To a significant extent, the failure to appreciate the difference between 
consortium and other forms of third-party recovery from the employer 
conditioned on injury to an employee has led courts astray, both in their 
interpretation of workers’ compensation statutes and in their non-statutory 
reasoning. Some of those claims seek to recover compensation for what
the employee would be entitled to in the tort system. Thus, a third party’s
contribution claim against the employer seeks to recover money paid to 
the employee based on the employee’s tort recovery against the third party. 
Those contribution claims should not be permitted against employers.109 
Their liability should be limited to the workers’ compensation measure of
benefits. Similarly, survival actions reflect claims for injuries suffered
based on the tort system that are properly barred by the exclusive remedy
provision of workers’ compensation. 
The same is true of claims by fathers and husbands for loss of services
of their wives and children in the days before loss of services morphed into 
consortium claims that addressed relational wrongs. Those loss-of-
107. See KRAMER & BRIFFAULT, supra note 10, at 23 (“Workers compensation
provides . . . benefits that compensate for lost wages . . . .”).
108. The exception to this error is the two states in which legislatures
overturned decisions by the courts that permitted consortium claims. See supra 
text accompanying note 60.
109. Rather, in fairness, the injured employee should bear any difference between 
the employer’s comparative share of tort liability and the employer’s workers’
compensation payment to the employee. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § C20 cmts. b–d (1998); Klein, supra note 7.
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8072020] CONSORTIUM AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
services claims represented lost earnings of the wife or child—earnings 
that fell squarely within the workers’ compensation bargain and were 
compensated by that system. Wrongful death claims are a bit more
complicated in that they contain a hybrid of tort compensation—the 
earnings the deceased worker would have devoted to dependents—and
harms to third parties—the equivalent of lost consortium when a spouse
dies. The former is a component of damages that is properly within the
employer’s immunity; the latter, like consortium, is not. In interpreting 
statutory exclusive remedy provisions across the land, courts, including 
the Hitaffer court that permitted consortium claims, have failed to
appreciate these principles.
What is surprising in this tale is how courts have universally failed to 
understand the matters raised in this Article. Also surprising is the lack of
academic attention to this state of affairs. We have grasped for 
explanations of how the current law came to be and confess that the straws 
for which we grasped all seemed to be chimeras. Much like families who
see their consortium claims dismissed because of courts’ misreading or 
misunderstanding, we are left without sound explanation. We conclude,
borrowing from Buffalo Springfield:
There’s something happening here 
What it is ain’t exactly clear.110 
110. BUFFALO SPRINGFIELD, For What It’s Worth (Atco Records 1966).
